Автор работы: Пользователь скрыл имя, 26 Февраля 2013 в 14:33, реферат
Цель исследования – выявить отличительные особенности текстов научно-технической направленности в свете задач, выполняемых ими как средством языковой коммуникации в области науки, и изучить влияние этих особенностей на практику перевода текстов в области оценки соответствия.
Цель исследования определила следующие задачи:
- Выделить особенности научного стиля английского языка по сравнению с русским языком;
- Исследовать терминологию в области оценки соответствия, принятую в авторитетных международных сообществах;
- Выделить основные трудности перевода терминологии научно-технических текстов и наметить пути их решения.
Материалом исследования послужили англоязычные стандарты в области разделения изотопов и применения их в ядерном реакторе.
1.Введение……………………………………………………………………...…3
2.Abstract………………………………………………………………………….5
3. Статьи «Isotope» ….…………………………………………………………..7
- «Isotope separation» ………………………………………………………….16
- «Nuclear reactor» …………………………………………………………….24
4. Перевод статей ………………………………………………………………43
5.Анализ перевода..…………………………………………………………….83
6. Словарь терминов и аббревиатур…………………………………………87
7. Список использованной литературы……………………………………..91
8.Приложения: технические статьи на английском языке (450тыс. знаков) ………………………………………………………………..................94
Temperature profile for a 20 mm diameter fuel pellet with a power density of 1000 W per cubic meter. The fuels other than uranium dioxide are not compromised.
Normal and abnormal conditions
The nuclear chemistry associated with the nuclear fuel cycle can be divided into two main areas, one area is concerned with operation under the intended conditions while the other area is concerned with maloperation conditions where some alteration from the normal operating conditions has occurred or (more rarely) an accident is occurring.
The releases of radioactivity from normal operations are the small planned releases from uranium ore processing, enrichment, power reactors, reprocessing plants and waste stores. These can be in a different chemical/physical form to the releases which could occur under accident conditions. In addition the isotope signature of a hypothetical accident may be very different to that of a planned normal operational discharge of radioactivity to the environment.
Just because a radioisotope is released it does not mean it will enter a human and then cause harm. For instance the migration of radioactivity can be altered by the binding of the radioisotope to the surfaces of soil particles. For example caesium binds tightly to clay minerals such as illite and montmorillonite hence it remains in the upper layers of soil where it can be accessed by plants with shallow roots (such as grass). Hence grass and mushrooms can carry a considerable amount of 137Cs which can be transferred to humans through the food chain. But 137Cs is not able to migrate quickly through most soils and thus is unlikely to contaminate well water. Colloids of soil minerals can migrate through soil so simple binding of a metal to the surfaces of soil particles does not fix the metal totally.
According to Jiří Hála's text book the distribution coefficient Kd is the ratio of the soil's radioactivity (Bq g−1) to that of the soil water (Bq ml−1). If the radioisotope is tightly bound to the minerals in the soil then less radioactivity can be absorbed by crops and grass growing on the soil.
Cs-137 Kd = 1000
Pu-239 Kd = 10000 to 100000
Sr-90 Kd = 80 to 150
I-131 Kd = 0.007 to 50
One of the best countermeasures in dairy farming against 137Cs is to mix up the soil by deeply ploughing the soil. This has the effect of putting the 137Cs out of reach of the shallow roots of the grass, hence the level of radioactivity in the grass will be lowered. Also after a nuclear war or serious accident the removal of top few cm of soil and its burial in a shallow trench will reduce the long term gamma dose to humans due to 137Cs as the gamma photons will be attenuated by their passage through the soil.
Even after the radioactive element arrives at the roots of the plant, the metal may be rejected by the biochemistry of the plant. The details of the uptake of 90Sr and 137Cs into sunflowers grown under hydroponic conditions has been reported.[8] The caesium was found in the leaf veins, in the stem and in the apical leaves. It was found that 12% of the caesium entered the plant, and 20% of the strontium. This paper also reports details of the effect of potassium, ammonium and calcium ions on the uptake of the radioisotopes.
In livestock farming an important countermeasure against 137Cs is to feed animals a small amount of prussian blue. This iron potassium cyanide compound acts as a ion-exchanger. The cyanide is so tightly bonded to the iron that it is safe for a human to eat several grams of prussian blue per day. The prussian blue reduces the biological half life (different from the nuclear half life) of the caesium. The physical or nuclear half life of 137Cs is about 30 years. This is a constant which can not be changed but the biological half life is not a constant. It will change according to the nature and habits of the organism for which it is expressed. Caesium in humans normally has a biological half life of between one and four months. An added advantage of the prussian blue is that the caesium which is stripped from the animal in the droppings is in a form which is not available to plants. Hence it prevents the caesium from being recycled. The form of prussian blue required for the treatment of humans or animals is a special grade. Attempts to use the pigment grade used in paints have not been successful. Note that a good source of data on the subject of caesium in Chernobyl fallout exists at [1] (Ukrainian Research Institute for Agricultural Radiology).
Release of radioactivity from fuel during normal use and accidents
The IAEA assume that under normal operation the coolant of a water cooled reactor will contain some radioactivity[9] but during a reactor accident the coolant radioactivity level may rise. The IAEA state that under a series of different conditions different amounts of the core inventory can be released from the fuel, the four conditions the IAEA consider are normal operation, a spike in coolant activity due to a sudden shutdown/loss of pressure (core remains covered with water), a cladding failure resulting in the release of the activity in the fuel/cladding gap (this could be due to the fuel being uncovered by the loss of water for 15–30 minutes where the cladding reached a temperature of 650-1250 oC) or a melting of the core (the fuel will have to be uncovered for at least 30 minutes, and the cladding would reach a temperature in excess of 1650 oC).[10]
Based upon the assumption that a PWR contains 300 tons of water, and that the activity of the fuel of a 1 GWe reactor is as the IAEA predict,[11] then the coolant activity after an accident such as the three mile island accident (where a core is uncovered and then recovered with water) can be predicted.
Releases from reprocessing under normal conditions
It is normal to allow used fuel to stand after the irradiation to allow the short-lived and radiotoxic iodine isotopes to decay away. In one experiment in the USA fresh fuel which had not been allowed to decay was reprocessed (the Green run[2][3][4]) to investigate the effects of a large iodine release from the reprocessing of short cooled fuel. It is normal in reprocessing plants to scrub the off gases from the dissolver to prevent the emission of iodine. In addition to the emission of iodine the noble gases and tritium are released from the fuel when it is dissolved. It has been proposed that by voloxidation (heating the fuel in a furnace under oxidizing conditions) the majority of the tritium can be recovered from the fuel.[5]
A paper was written on the radioactivity in oysters found in the Irish Sea.[12] These were found by gamma spectroscopy to contain 141Ce, 144Ce, 103Ru, 106Ru, 137Cs, 95Zr and 95Nb. Additionally, a zinc activation product (65Zn) was found, which is thought to be due to the corrosion of magnox fuel cladding in cooling ponds. It is likely that the modern releases of all these isotopes from Windscale is smaller.
On-load reactors
Some reactor designs, such as RBMKs or CANDU reactors, can be refueled without being shut down. This is achieved through the use of many small pressure tubes to contain the fuel and coolant, as opposed to one large pressure vessel as in pressurized water reactor (PWR) or boiling water reactor (BWR) designs. Each tube can be individually isolated and refueled by an operator-controlled fueling machine, typically at a rate of up to 8 channels per day out of roughly 400 in CANDU reactors. On-load refueling allows for the problem of optimal fuel reloading problem to be dealt with continuously, leading to more efficient use of fuel. This increase in efficiency is partially offset by the added complexity of having hundreds of pressure tubes and the fueling machines to service them.
Interim storage
After its operating cycle, the reactor is shut down for refueling. The fuel discharged at that time (spent fuel) is stored either at the reactor site (commonly in a spent fuel pool) or potentially in a common facility away from reactor sites. If on-site pool storage capacity is exceeded, it may be desirable to store the now cooled aged fuel in modular dry storage facilities known as Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSI) at the reactor site or at a facility away from the site. The spent fuel rods are usually stored in water or boric acid, which provides both cooling (the spent fuel continues to generate decay heat as a result of residual radioactive decay) and shielding to protect the environment from residual ionizing radiation, although after at least a year of cooling they may be moved to dry cask storage.
Transportation
Main article: Spent nuclear fuel shipping cask
Reprocessing
Main article: Nuclear reprocessing
See also: Spent nuclear fuel
The Sellafield reprocessing plant
Spent fuel discharged from reactors contains appreciable quantities of fissile (U-235 and Pu-239), fertile (U-238), and other radioactive materials, including reaction poisons, which is why the fuel had to be removed. These fissile and fertile materials can be chemically separated and recovered from the spent fuel. The recovered uranium and plutonium can, if economic and institutional conditions permit, be recycled for use as nuclear fuel. This is currently not done for civilian spent nuclear fuel in the United States.
Mixed oxide, or MOX fuel, is a blend of reprocessed uranium and plutonium and depleted uranium which behaves similarly, although not identically, to the enriched uranium feed for which most nuclear reactors were designed. MOX fuel is an alternative to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel used in the light water reactors which predominate nuclear power generation.
Currently, plants in Europe are reprocessing spent fuel from utilities in Europe and Japan. Reprocessing of spent commercial-reactor nuclear fuel is currently not permitted in the United States due to the perceived danger of nuclear proliferation. However the recently announced Global Nuclear Energy Partnership would see the U.S. form an international partnership to see spent nuclear fuel reprocessed in a way that renders the plutonium in it usable for nuclear fuel but not for nuclear weapons.
Partitioning and transmutation
As an alternative to the disposal of the PUREX raffinate in glass or Synroc, the most radiotoxic elements can be removed through advanced reprocessing. After separation the minor actinides and some long lived fission products can be converted to short-lived isotopes by either neutron or photon irradiation. This is called transmutation.
Waste disposal
Main articles: Radioactive waste and Spent nuclear fuel
A current concern in the nuclear power field is the safe disposal and isolation of either spent fuel from reactors or, if the reprocessing option is used, wastes from reprocessing plants. These materials must be isolated from the biosphere until the radioactivity contained in them has diminished to a safe level.[13] In the U.S., under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 as amended, the Department of Energy has responsibility for the development of the waste disposal system for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. Current plans call for the ultimate disposal of the wastes in solid form in a licensed deep, stable geologic structure called a deep geological repository. The Department of Energy chose Yucca Mountain as the location for the repository. However, its opening has been repeatedly delayed.
It is worth noting that some non-PLWR reactor designs, and in particular the ones using liquid thorium fuel in molten salt reactors, would produce virtually no long-lasting nuclear waste. It is also possible to burn rather than bury nuclear waste, for instance in Integral Fast Reactors or in variations of molten salt reactors.[citation needed]
A proposed type of nuclear reactor called a traveling wave reactor is claimed, if it were to be built, to be able to be fueled by nuclear waste, and to be able to operate for 200 years without needing any refueling.
Fuel cycles
Once-through nuclear fuel cycle
A once through (or open) fuel cycle
Not a cycle per se, fuel is used once and then sent to storage without further processing save additional packaging to provide for better isolation from the biosphere. This method is favored by six countries: the United States, Canada, Sweden, Finland, Spain and South Africa.[15] Some countries, notably Sweden and Canada, have designed repositories to permit future recovery of the material should the need arise, while others plan for permanent sequestration in a geological repository like the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository in the United States.
Plutonium cycle
A fuel cycle in which plutonium is used for fuel
Several countries, including Japan, Switzerland, and previously Spain and Germany,[citation needed] are using or have used the reprocessing services offered by BNFL and COGEMA. Here, the fission products, minor actinides, activation products, and reprocessed uranium are separated from the reactor-grade plutonium, which can then be fabricated into MOX fuel. Because the proportion of the non-fissile even-mass isotopes of plutonium rises with each pass through the cycle, there are currently no plans to reuse plutonium from used MOX fuel for a third pass in a thermal reactor. However, if fast reactors become available, they may be able to burn these, or almost any other actinide isotopes.
Minor actinides recycling
It has been proposed that in addition to the use of plutonium, the minor actinides could be used in a critical power reactor. Tests are already being conducted in which americium is being used as a fuel.
A number of reactor designs, like the Integral Fast Reactor, have been designed for this rather different fuel cycle. In principle, it should be possible to derive energy from the fission of any actinide nucleus. With a careful reactor design, all the actinides in the fuel can be consumed, leaving only lighter elements with short half-lives. Whereas this has been done in prototype plants, no such reactor has ever been operated on a large scale, and the first plants with full actinide recovery are expected to be ready for commercial deployment in 2015 at the earliest.
However, such schemes would most likely require advanced remote reprocessing methods due to the neutron emitting compounds formed. For instance if curium is irradiated with neutrons it will form the very heavy actinides californium and fermium which undergo spontaneous fission. As a result, the neutron emission from a used fuel element which had included curium will be much higher, potentially posing a risk to workers at the back end of the cycle unless all reprocessing is done remotely. This could be seen as a disadvantage, but on the other hand it also makes the nuclear material difficult to steal or divert, making it more resistant to nuclear proliferation
It so happens that the neutron cross-section of many actinides decreases with increasing neutron energy, but the ratio of fission to simple activation (neutron capture) changes in favour of fission as the neutron energy increases. Thus with a sufficiently high neutron energy, it should be possible to destroy even curium without the generation of the transcurium metals. This could be very desirable as it would make it significantly easier to reprocess and handle the actinide fuel.
One promising alternative from this perspective is an accelerator driven subcritical reactor. Here a beam of either protons (United States and European designs)[17][18][19] or electrons (Japanese design)[20] is directed into a target. In the case of protons, very fast neutrons will spall off the target, while in the case of the electrons, very high energy photons will be generated. These high-energy neutrons and photons will then be able to cause the fission of the heavy actinides.
Such reactors compare very well to other neutron sources in terms of neutron energy:
Thermal 0 to 100 eV
Epithermal 100 eV to 100 KeV
Fast (from nuclear fission) 100 KeV to 3 MeV
DD fusion 2.5 MeV
DT fusion 14 MeV
Accelerator driven core 200 MeV (lead driven by 1.6 GeV protons)
Muon-catalyzed fusion 7 GeV.
As an alternative, the curium-244, with a half life of 18 years, could be left to decay into plutonium-240 before being used in fuel in a fast reactor.
A pair of fuel cycles in which uranium and plutonium are kept separate from the minor actinides. The minor actinide cycle is kept within the green box.
Fuel or targets for this actinide transmutation
To date the nature of the fuel (targets) for actinide transformation has not been chosen.
If actinides are transmuted in a Subcritical reactor it is likely that the fuel will have to be able to tolerate more thermal cycles than conventional fuel. An accelerator driven sub critical reactor is unlikely to be able to maintain a constant operation period for equally long times as a critical reactor, and each time the accelerator stops then the fuel will cool down.
On the other hand, if actinides are destroyed using a fast reactor, such as an Integral Fast Reactor, then the fuel will most likely not be exposed to many more thermal cycles than in a normal power station.
Depending on the matrix the process can generate more transuranics from the matrix. This could either be viewed as good (generate more fuel) or can be viewed as bad (generation of more radiotoxic transuranic elements). A series of different matrices exists which can control this production of heavy actinides.
Fissile nuclei, like Uranium-235, Plutonium-239 and Uranium-233 respond well to delayed neutrons and are thus important to keep a critical reactor stable, and this limits the amount of minor actinides that can be destroyed in a critical reactor. As a consequence it is important that the chosen matrix allows the reactor to keep the ratio of fissile to non-fissile nuclei high, as this enables it to destroy the long lived actinides safely. In contrast, the power output of a sub-critical reactor is limited by the intensity of the driving particle accelerator, and thus it need not contain any uranium or plutonium at all. In such a system it may be preferable to have an inert matrix that doesn't produce additional long-lived isotopes.
Actinides in an inert matrix
The actinides will be mixed with a metal which will not form more actinides, for instance an alloy of actinides in a solid such as zirconia could be used.
Actinides in a thorium matrix
Thorium will on neutron bombardment form uranium-233. U-233 is fissile, and has a larger fission cross section than both U-235 and U-238, and thus it is likely to produce very little additional actinides through neutron capture.
Actinides in a uranium matrix
If the actinides are incorporated into a uranium-metal or uranium-oxide matrix, then the neutron capture of U-238 is likely to generate new plutonium-239. An advantage of mixing the actinides with uranium and plutonium is that the large fission cross sections of U-235 and Pu-239 for the less energetic delayed-neutrons could make the reaction stable enough to be carried out in a critical fast reactor, which is likely to be both cheaper and simpler than an accelerator driven system.
Mixed matrix
It is also possible to create a matrix made from a mix of the above mentioned materials. This is most commonly done in fast reactors where one may wish to keep the breeding ratio of new fuel high enough to keep powering the reactor, but still low enough that the generated actinides can be safely destroyed without transporting them to another site. One way to do this is to use fuel where actinides and uranium is mixed with inert zirconium, producing fuel elements with the desired properties.
Thorium cycle
Main article: Thorium fuel cycle
In the thorium fuel cycle thorium-232 absorbs a neutron in either a fast or thermal reactor. The thorium-233 beta decays to protactinium-233 and then to uranium-233, which in turn is used as fuel. Hence, like uranium-238, thorium-232 is a fertile material.
After starting the reactor with existing U-233 or some other fissile material such as U-235 or Pu-239, a breeding cycle similar to but more efficient[21] than that with U-238 and plutonium can be created. The Th-232 absorbs a neutron to become Th-233 which quickly decays to protactinium-233. Protactinium-233 in turn decays with a half-life of 27 days to U-233. In some molten salt reactor designs, the Pa-233 is extracted and protected from neutrons (which could transform it to Pa-234 and then to U-234), until it has decayed to U-233. This is done in order to improve the breeding ratio which is low compared to fast reactors.
Thorium is at least 4-5 times more abundant in nature than all of uranium isotopes combined; thorium is fairly evenly spread around Earth with a lot of countries[22] having huge supplies of it; preparation of thorium fuel does not require difficult [21] and expensive enrichment processes; the thorium fuel cycle creates mainly Uranium-233 contaminated with Uranium-232 which makes it harder to use in a normal, pre-assembled nuclear weapon which is stable over long periods of time (unfortunately drawbacks are much lower for immediate use weapons or where final assembly occurs just prior to usage time); elimination of at least the transuranic portion of the nuclear waste problem is possible in MSR and other breeder reactor designs.
One of the earliest efforts to use a thorium fuel cycle took place at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the 1960s. An experimental reactor was built based on molten salt reactor technology to study the feasibility of such an approach, using thorium fluoride salt kept hot enough to be liquid, thus eliminating the need for fabricating fuel elements. This effort culminated in the Molten-Salt Reactor Experiment that used 232Th as the fertile material and 233U as the fissile fuel. Due to a lack of funding, the MSR program was discontinued in 1976.
Current industrial activity
Currently the only isotopes used as nuclear fuel are uranium-235 (U-235), uranium-238 (U-238) and plutonium-239, although the proposed thorium fuel cycle has advantages. Some modern reactors, with minor modifications, can use thorium. Thorium is approximately three times more abundant in the Earth's crust than uranium (and 550 times more abundant than uranium-235). However, there has been little exploration for thorium resources, and thus the proved resource is small. Thorium is more plentiful than uranium in some countries, notably India.[23]
Heavy water reactors and graphite-moderated reactors can use natural uranium, but the vast majority of the world's reactors require enriched uranium, in which the ratio of U-235 to U-238 is increased. In civilian reactors the enrichment is increased to as much as 5% U-235 and 95% U-238, but in naval reactors there is as much as 93% U-235.
The term nuclear fuel is not normally used in respect to fusion power, which fuses isotopes of hydrogen into helium to release energy.
Integrated Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information System
Main article: Integrated Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information System
Integrated nuclear fuel cycle information system (iNFCIS) is a set of databases related to the nuclear fuel cycle maintained by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). iNFCIS provides information on various aspects of nuclear fuel cycles. Presently iNFCIS includes UDEPO - World distribution of uranium deposits; NFCIS - Nuclear fuel cycle information system, a database of civilian nuclear fuel cycle facilities; PIEDB - Post irradiation examination facilities database; MABD - Minor actinide property database and NFCSS - Nuclear fuel cycle simulation system, a tool for modeling material flow and actinide accumulations in the nuclear fuel cycle. iNFCIS requires free registration for on-line access.
The Manhattan Project was the effort, led by the United States with participation from the United Kingdom and Canada, which resulted in the development of the first atomic bomb during World War II. From 1942 to 1946 the project was under the command of Major General Leslie R. Groves Jr. of the US Army Corps of Engineers. The Army component of the project was designated the Manhattan District or Manhattan Engineer District (MED), but "Manhattan" gradually superseded the official codename for the project.
The project had its roots in the Einstein–Szilárd letter, which warned that Nazi Germany might develop nuclear weapons. The letter was written by prominent physicists, signed by Albert Einstein, and delivered to President Franklin D. Roosevelt in October 1939. The Manhattan Project, which began as a small research program that year, eventually employed more than 130,000 people at a cost of nearly US$2 billion. Research and production took place at more than 30 sites, some secret, including universities across the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada. The three primary research and production sites of the project were the plutonium-production facility at the Hanford Site in eastern Washington state, the uranium enrichment facilities at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and the weapons research and design laboratory at Los Alamos, New Mexico.
Two types of atomic bombs were developed during the war. A gun-type fission weapon was made from uranium-235, an isotope of uranium that makes up only 0.7 percent of natural uranium. This isotope proved difficult to separate from the main isotope, uranium-238, since it was chemically identical and almost the same weight. Three methods were employed for isotope separation: electromagnetic, gaseous and thermal. Most of this work was performed at Oak Ridge. This design proved impractical to use with plutonium so an implosion-type nuclear weapon was developed through a concerted design and construction effort at Los Alamos. An implosion bomb was the first nuclear device ever detonated, at the Trinity test on 16 July 1945. A gun-type weapon, Little Boy, was dropped at Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, while a more complex plutonium-core weapon, Fat Man, was dropped at Nagasaki three days later.
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